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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG FARMS LIMITED, a limited 
partnership, PHILLIP 0. BOYER, 
VIRGIL CONDON, BOYD J. FARR, 
HOMER L. HALE, MARIE M. IRVINE, 
G. KENNETH JOHNSON, KENNETH W. 
JONES, ROBERT C. NEWMAN, TOFFIE 
SAWAYA, RICHARD STOVER, WILLIAM 
TINGEY, JAMES E. WATTS, RALPH M. 
WRIGHT, limited partners, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
RICHTRON, INC., a Utah corporation, 
and PAUL H. RICHINS; ARAL WESLEY 
ALLREAD and SARAH ELAINE ALLRED, 
his wife; BANK OF UTAH, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants, 
LEO H. RICHINS, 
Intervening Respondent. 
REPLY TO INTERVENING RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
Intervening respondent, in the last sentence of the first paragraph, 
states that the issue of who was to be the general partner of the Young Farms 
limited partnership was not adjudicated in this case but had been adjudicated 
previously in another case. The record indicates that the defendants filed a 
counter claim in response to the original complaint (R. 18). The first nine 
paragraphs of the counter claim set forth a claim based upon the concept that 
the defendant Richtron, Inc. is the only entity entitled to act as the plaintiff 
Young Farms, Limited general partner. 
The defendants1 answer and cross claim to the plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint (R. 274) fails to include a counter claim and there is no 
claim that the limited partnership is being improperly represented, although 
on their Fifth Defense the defendants claim lack of standing on behalf of the 
individual plaintiffs. 
At the end of the first pre-trial, defendant's counsel included 
the question of whether or not Richtronfs resignation as a general partner 
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gave plaintiff the right to substitute as general partner (R. 446), On the 
31st day of October, 1983 the defendant Paul H. Richins submitted an Affidavit 
(R. 521) including all of the arguments and documentation to support the argu-
ments that he makes now in regard to whether or not the plaintiff limited 
partnership can be represented by someone else other than the defendant Richtron, 
Inc. The defendant Paul H. Richins then made a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the basis of the arguments made in his 
Affidavit. This was done on November 1, 1983 (R. 583). Defendant Richin's 
Motion was denied and the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (R. 584, 585). 
The Court's ruling in regard to defendants Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ajudicates the issue of whether 
or not the plaintiff can be represented by someone other than Richtron, Inc.. 
However, this issue is not one that is material to the appeal by the plaintiffs 
and the intervening respondent Leo Richins. 
Leo Richins contention that the $10,431 that was deposited into 
the Court as the 1980 payment on the real estate contract was deposited on 
behalf of Paul H. Richins likewise doesn't stand up to a perusal of the record. 
The original order requiring the deposit was entered on the 16th day of February, 
1982 and required the defendants to deposit into the Court the sum of $10,431 
which represents the 1980 payment on the Allred contract and the plaintiff was 
to deposit a like sum into the Court, representing the 1981 Allred contract 
payment (R« 234). The minute entry (R. 233) provided that Richtron was to 
put the money in the Davis County Clerk's office. If the defendant Richins 
did not like the way the order was drafted and contended that he had no interest 
in the contract, his counsel should have had the order read that only Richtron 
was required to make the payment. Instead, all other orders dealing with the 
deposit (R. 317, 358, 359, 419, 445 and 453) deal with the Letter of Credit as 
coming from both defendants. In fact, the defendants Motion for an Order 
Setting Aside and Vacating the Order Respecting the Collection of the Letter 
of Credit (R. 459) claims that the order (R. 453) dated June 9, 1983 requiring 
the payment should be set aside and vacated because the defendant Richtron, Inc. 
had filed in bankruptcy and the Court did not have jurisdiction to require the 
defendant Richtron, Inc. to provide the funds. This motion was denied (R« 487). 
The Court granted the plaintiff's Motion for a Partial Summary 
Judgment, dismissing the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins as 
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defendants and thereafter dealt with the question of the relationship between 
the plaintiffs being the Young Farms limited partnership and the defendants 
Allred being the owners of the limited partnership property. 
The money was deposited in the Court not by Leo Richins but 
was deposited in the Court by the defendants. The fact that the Letter of 
Credit was drawn on the account of Leo Richins has no materiality. The Court 
cannot go in back of the immediate transfer to determine who put up the money 
or for what reasons. The money was put in for the purpose of the 1980 payment. 
The appellants were required to make that payment to the Allreds to keep the 
contract viable (R. 660). The source from which the money came was the 
defendants and not Leo Richins. 
REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In Intervening Respondent's Statement of Facts, Mr. Richins 
spends a great deal of time on the proposition that Young Farms Limited has 
no authority to bring the action and the appeal. This issue is one between 
the defendant Richtron, Inc. and the plaintiffs and was fully resolved by 
the trial court, appealed from by the defendant Richtron, Inc., and their 
appeal was later withdrawn and is not an issue in this appeal and Mr. Richins 
has no standing to raise these issues on behalf of Richtron, Inc. 
It is interesting that Mr. Richins brings in evidence that is 
not a part of the record and which is immaterial to this case (see footnote 
on p. 8 of Mr. Richins' brief). 
The last part of the last sentence in the finishing paragraph 
number 31 refers to $75,000 that was a liability of Young Farms to Richtron. 
There was no evidence of a liability of Young Farms to Richtron. In fact, as 
pointed out earlier, the defendant Richtron did not file a counter claim against 
the plaintiff Young Farms Limited. 
Mr. Leo Richins spends a great deal of time in his Statement of 
Facts pointing out that he was not a party, was not obligated to make any payments 
in this lawsuit, that he did so on behalf of the defendant Paul H. Richins, his 
son, and that his son had no interest in the property or any obligation to make 
the payment, that he, Leo, had previously paid almost all of the 1980 payment 
that was put into the escrow ($9,310.33 of it), for which he received an interest 
in the contract, and yet he claims that he has an interest in the money paid. 
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I can't see where it makes any difference if Mr. Leo Richins 
provided the source from which the funds came. The funds were placed into 
the Court for the purpose of being the 1980 contract payment to the Allreds. 
Once the defendants were dismissed out of the lawsuit, the funds should have 
been maintained for that purpose and that purpose alone. 
Mr. Paul Richins was the president of Richtron, Inc. Richtron, 
Inc. had a fiduciary duty to see to it that the payment was made on the contract 
as that money had been paid by the plaintiffs to make that payment. The rela-
tionship between Leo Richins and his son in regard to the payment is immaterial 
and the funds belong to the plaintiffs as they were required to make up the 
payment to the Allreds in order to keep the real estate contract viable for the 
limited partnership. 
ARGUMENTS 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT I 
There is no question but what the Court's order was a final 
order in regard to the 1980 payment and the money involved therein, nor was 
there any necessity for any sworn statement from the plaintiffs in regard 
to their claim for the $10,431. This money was put into the Court as the 
1980 payment on a contract that was being purchased by the plaintiffs. 
They had the possessory right to the property and they had a legal right to 
have the general partner protect their investment interests as the general 
partner was their fiduciary agent in this regard. 
The appeal was not taken until all of the issues were disposed 
of in the case. The issue in regard to the $10,431 was reserved and was 
appealed after the final order of the Court. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT II 
In response to Mr. Richins' argument that the appellant Young 
Farms has no right to file or maintain this appeal, Mr. Leo Richins is not 
the party that has any interest in this determination. This right would only 
relate to Richtron, Inc. and Mr. Richins is not representing Richtron, Inc. in 
any sense of the word and the defendant Richtron, Inc. has not filed a brief 
as leave was given them to do by this Sourt. 
There is no question that the District Court has the right to 
determine the relationship and rights of the parties and this matter is res 
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judicata; this issue was determined judicially by the lower court and that 
determination was appealed by the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins, 
and their appeal was withdrawn (R. 598, 605, 675, 676), and the question of 
appellant Young Farms' right to maintain this appeal is res judicata. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT III 
It is interesting that Mr. Leo Richins would make this argument 
which basically supports the appellants1 position in regard to the Blackfoot 
Farms case. Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins were parties to this action. 
They were dismissed out of the action. If you follow Mr. Richinsf argument 
to its logical conclusion, the monies that were deposited in the Court would 
then belong to the remaining parties, i.e., the plaintiffs and7or defendants 
Allreds, which is exactly the point the plaintiffs are making. 
If Mr. Leo Richins had wanted to be a party, he should have 
made an effort to become one in the District Court. If he thought he had an 
interest in the money, he should have made an effort to protect his interest 
in the District Court. If the defendants had wanted to present arguments and/or 
be heard, they could have done so. The plaintiffs made a motion to reinstate 
Mr. Paul Richins as a party and to try the case as a whole (see pages 4 through 
8 of the transcript). Mr. Richins objected to plaintiffs' motion to reinstate 
the defendants into the action. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT IV 
Mr. Leo Richins in this argument fails to recognize that what 
the lower court did in this action was conduct an accounting of the rights of 
the parties to the limited partnership's assets and rule that the limited 
partnership's assets belonged to the limited partnership and that the defendants 
Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins had no interest therein and that, upon payment 
of the outstanding obligations on the contract of sale to the Allreds, that 
contract was reinstated in the name of the Young Farms Limited and not in the 
name of Richtron, Inc. 
This argument is moot as the general partner and its president 
were previously dismissed out of the action and the rights of the parties were 
determined by the Court, appealed from, and their appeal withdrawn. 
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The $10,431 was deposited, without question, for the purpose 
of being the 1980 payment on the real estate contract, which represented the 
real estate which comprised the assets of the limited partnership. Who has 
a better right to the limited partnership assets than the limited partnership 
and its limited partners? The Court makes that determination and the defen-
dants objected to that determination and appealed that ruling and later 
withdrew their appeal. That ought to make the issue moot. 
A review of the record, in particular the final order (R. 678), 
can lead to no other conclusion but that the Court determined the rights of 
the parties in regard to the limited partnership property and made a final 
accounting in regard to that property and the rights of the parties to it. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT V 
1 canTt understand how, if Mr. Paul Richins has no liability 
for any of Richtron Inc.'s obligations, he would have been so willing to put 
$10,431 into the Court. He was represented by competent counsel at the time. 
If he objected to the placing of the money into Court, he should have made 
the objection known and/or changed the order. He was certainly aware that 
the purpose for the $10,431 was the 1980 payment which he, as the president 
of Richtron, Inc,, withdrew from the escrow account, knowing that there were 
no funds to replace it. 
I fail to see where this argument has any materiality to the 
question of Mr. Leo Richins' right to the money. Mr. Leo Richins didn't put 
the money into the Court, Mr. Paul Richins did. Mr. Leo Richins provided the 
money to his son, Paul Richins, and I don't believe the reasons for his 
providing those funds have any materiality whatsoever as to what those funds 
were to be used for or placed in the Court for. They were placed into the 
Court for the purpose of paying the 1980 payment on the Allred contract. 
There is absolutely no question at all about that fact. Whether the funds 
were paid by Paul Richins mistakenly or by his father to Paul and then to 
the Court makes no difference. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENT VI 
TTThe initial 'Order to Compel Deposit' signed by Judge J. 
Duffy Palmer (R. 234) required Richtron and Paul Richins to deposit $10,431 
into Court, representing the 1980 payment on the Allred contract, to be held 
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'PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN THE ALLRED CONTRACT 
AND THE PROPERTIES UNDERLYING SAID CONTRACT.r" (p. 39 of Brief of Intervenor.) 
The Court determined the rights of the parties in the Allred contract. The 
Court determined that the Young Farms Limited, the limited partnership, had 
the right, upon the payment of the delinquent payments, of which the 1980 
$10,431 was one, to be put in the place of defendant Richtron, Inc. as the 
purchaser of the property covered by the Allred contract. The Court made 
the determination that the defendants Paul Richins and Richtron, Inc. had 
no interest in that property. There can be no other interpretation of the 
results of this lawsuit. The Court's ruling that the Court would go in back 
of the initial deposit to determine where the money came from and award the 
money to that party, Mr. Leo Richins, who is not a party to the lawsuit, is 
in error and that error should be cured by this appeal. 
REPLY TO ARGUMENTS VII AND VIII 
In reply to arguments VII and VIII, it makes no difference why 
Leo Richins deposited the Letter of Credit. The Letter of Credit was the same 
as cash and no consideration was required for it. It was deposited for the 
purpose of paying the 1980 payment on the Allred contract. The fact that it 
was contributed by Mr. Leo Richins does not make it his property. It was 
deposited to replace a payment that was made by the defendant Richtron, Inc. 
on behalf of and with the funds that should have been from the plaintiff 
limited partnership. The question of where cash comes from to make a payment 
required by the Court under the contract is immaterial. This Court should 
look at what the purpose was for which the money was deposited. It was 
deposited, without question, as the 1980 payment on the Allred contract 
covering the limited partnership's real property. 
CONCLUSION 
The $10,431 was to be the 1980 payment. It was paid by 
the limited partnership to the general partner for that purpose and it 
was later required that the limited partnership pay it again in order to 
maintain its property rights. The limited partnership should have the right 
to recover this payment. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 1985. 
SEPH S. £N0WLT0N 
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